Blogging My Dissertation

Having written about my ill-fated attempt to write a doctoral dissertation, a deeply painful topic even after all these years, I find myself returning to that dissertation on the politics of Jewish messianism. I am going to attempt to edit selections from the dissertation, stripped of their footnotes, to be used as blog posts. I readily acknowledge that this was not a suitable topic for a dissertation. That being said, I still strongly believe in the ideas presented in the dissertation. As such, I wish to present them to my readers. Hopefully, you will find what I have to say useful for understanding the underlying logic of messianism in its political and spiritual forms. Perhaps one of my readers will turn out to be a university administrator, who is so impressed with me as to wish to offer me a doctorate. This is a dissertation about messianism, the willingness to hope against all evidence that history will suddenly and miraculously turn out in one's favor so a failed doctoral student has the right to dream. 

The problem that drew me to this topic of political messianism is that there are two basic kinds of messianism, the political and the spiritual and they are fundamentally at odds with each other. What is the Messiah supposed to accomplish when he comes? Perhaps he is supposed to bring back the not so golden biblical age of David and Solomon on the assumption that this time we are going to get things right. In this political messianism, the natural order of things, particularly the existence of politics remains intact. This is essential as this will finally allow us Jews to rule over the gentiles as we were always "meant" to. Alternatively, we can imagine the Messiah ushering in a spiritual era that will transcend the physical world, leaving no room for politics. When Jews, for thousands of years have prayed for the Messiah, it seems that they were simultaneously asking for political power and for the end of politics. Keep in mind that political power is something deeply materialistic, the sort of thing that pious people should abhor. How could such contradictory impulses have survived in one religion without tearing it into factions?  

My essential argument is that both political and spiritual messianisms should be understood as the product of a discourse between three different models for a religion to relate to the political. The military model relies on community and ritual. Opposing the military model are two anti-community models, which rely on doctrine instead of ritual. The missionary model outright rejects the community and seeks to create a new religion by seeking outside converts to create a new purer community. The esoteric model remains more closely tied to the community and either seeks to take it over from within or form its own competing sect. One thinks of Leo Strauss style philosophers, but this can apply to conventional believers as well. Understand that most people, operating within the military model with its focus on lived experience, do not even think in terms of trying to put together a coherent theology. 

Judaism is primarily military in its orientation. That being said, it has taken on the esoteric and missionary models, despite the theological difficulties, as a response to certain political realities. This mixture created a certain level of tension as the different models contain contradictory principles. Messianic doctrines serve both as a reflection of this tension within Judaism and as an attempted solution. Messianism has thus served an important role in Judaism in that it is precisely its contradictory political and spiritual poles that have allowed Judaism to mediate the conflict between the three ideological factions. 

Forgiving My Advisor (Part II)

(Part I)

I do not think it was a coincidence, that it was precisely when I started dating Miriam in 2011 that I made my major breakthrough that messianism, with its contradictory political and spiritual elements, is the product of a dialectic between what I had come to think of as the military, esoteric, and missionary models of religion. Military model messianism is fulfilled through the success of a political state. The esoteric and missionary models of messianism look forward to the elimination of this very political state that the military model clings to. Messianism, as we find it in Judaism, is a marriage between these different sides with the different parties wanting contrary things and simply talking past each other. This has allowed Judaism to function as a united religion. Granted, the topic I was working on was still not something that I was qualified to work on but at least I had a coherent argument to make.

Even though I was now living in California, I remained in regular correspondence with my advisor and sent him drafts of the chapters I was writing. He eventually agreed to allow me to drop the parts about Christianity and Islam to focus on Judaism. Furthermore, recognizing that what I had written was now significantly longer than a conventional dissertation, he allowed me to hand in only the first four chapters of my project. Chapter one laid out my general theoretical framework for the different models of religion and how they relate to messianism. Chapter two dealt with the biblical period and the fact that the messianism of the prophets required the destruction of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Chapter three dealt with the Second Temple Period and focused heavily on the Dead Sea Sect and its messianic rejection of the political establishment. Chapter four dealt with the post-Temple rabbis and their development of a spiritual messianism that took political activity off the table in the present by placing it in the forever-distant future.

While my advisor had his criticisms, particularly when it came to how my arguments were organized, he strongly praised my work. He was impressed with my research and found my arguments to be brilliant. He made it clear that he was on board with what I was doing and wanted to make sure that everyone else who read my work was as impressed as he was. Judging by his comments, his favorite section was the Second Temple chapter. For the Rabbinic chapter, he expressed some reservations as to whether I was really writing about messianism, but he made it clear that he thought that I was doing fantastic work. 

Spurred on by my advisor's support, I put my heart and soul into improving the dissertation to make my arguments clear to anyone reading them for the first time. By May of 2013, I had a coherent dissertation that came in around three hundred pages. My advisor now felt that what I had produced was good enough to start showing it to other scholars who might wish to serve on my committee. It was here that disaster struck. Readers started to respond that this was not a dissertation.

The right thing for my advisor would have been to go to the department and acknowledge that this was his fault and I deserved the doctorate. I was in this mess precisely because I had listened to him and did my best to do what he told me. Either I should be given an honorary doctorate, or I should be given funding to write a new dissertation, with him agreeing to pay any penalty to make that happen. Instead, my advisor decided to pretend that, for all of these years, I had simply been going off on my own instead of doing my best to follow his specific instructions. When emailing me, he pretended to still be on my side, telling me that he would speak to people who might be able to help me while bad-mouthing me behind my back, giving them every excuse to dismiss my work without giving it serious thought. This included the Second Temple chapter. As far as I can tell, he did not show them what he had written in praise of that chapter. If he had done so, those scholars might have had to rethink their dismissal or acknowledge that my youthful failure to write a successful dissertation paled in the face of my advisor's professional malpractice. Ultimately, my advisor made the decision to sacrifice my hoped-for career as an academic in order to protect his reputation.

His actions clearly involved falsehood. I am uncertain whether he actively lied about me to members of the department or if he simply allowed them to assume that I had gotten into this mess on my own. It is even possible that it was understood that he was the one at fault but, as there was no formal mechanism for penalizing advisors who failed in their duties to their students, the other members of the department protected their own and took the stance that this was my fault as a convenient belief that allowed the whole affair to be tied up in the most convenient fashion for them.

The final nail in my dissertation's coffin came in an email that reached me while I was at the Fuller Theological Seminary Library. By then I knew that the dissertation was likely not going to be accepted but I wanted to keep fighting for it as long as there was any hope. I had put so much of my emotional self into the dissertation that it felt to me almost like my child. One does not give up on a child no matter the odds. I was so focused on my work that I did not see the email for several hours until I stopped for lunch. My advisor forwarded me an email from a professor who dismissed my work while clearly not having read it carefully. From his response, it was clear that my advisor had been speaking ill of me to this professor. 

One would have thought that something like this deserved at least a phone call. My advisor knew that I had a history of depression and that the dissertation situation had put me in a bad place. What sort of person sends information that he knows would negatively affect someone he cares about without following up to find out how they are doing? Clearly, by this point, my well-being was no longer his priority.   

If I were to be charitable to my advisor, I can imagine that, from his perspective, he had been doing me a favor by agreeing to take me on as his student in the first place. As such, any advice that he offered me should have been taken with a buyer-beware attitude, much as if I were to take advice from any other academic I might have spoken to. From this perspective, the fact that my dissertation failed after years spent following his bad advice was really my fault. I should have known better than to listen to him.

Forgiving My Advisor (Part I)

In the previous post, I discussed some of my mistakes in how I approached pursuing a doctorate. Now I would like to turn to what my advisor did to me. Graduate students in their 20s can be expected to not know what they are doing precisely because this is something unlike anything they have done before. This is why graduate students are supposed to have advisors who know what they are doing as they have done this before. Ideally, they should have already guided other doctoral candidates through the process. At the very least, they should have written a dissertation themselves. Advisors are not supposed to make things worse for students than if they had been allowed to proceed on their own. 

I chose to come study with my advisor because he was a specialist in Jewish History. I wanted to work on an Abarbanel dissertation (either on his views on Kabbalah or Messianism) and my advisor initially said he could work with me on that. (He would later lie about this fact even though I had the email in which he said this.) I did not concern myself with the fact that I was going to be his first doctoral student. The university he taught at offered me funding, so he clearly wanted to work with me.

I should add that there were several non-academic factors as well that appealed to me and ended up taking on more weight than they should have. We had a number of friends in common and people I respected told me to go study with him. I honestly liked him and thought we would get along in addition to working on my dissertation. Considering these things, it seemed only reasonable that I should take the path forward and start working with my advisor. I would do the coursework, write the dissertation, and embark on my academic career. It did not occur to me to wait a few years, while doing something else, in the hope that a better option might come around.

It was only after I committed myself to come work with him that my advisor pulled a surprise on me. While he initially had told me that I could do a project on Abarbanel, he now informed me that he would not agree to something that narrowly focused on Abarbanel. For that matter, he was not going to let me write anything that was simply about Jewish thought. He insisted that I write on some sort of grand topic that would appeal to people outside of the field of Jewish History. He also told me to write my dissertation and then he would put together a dissertation committee. Being young and inexperienced, I had no idea that both of his instructions were the exact opposite of what one is supposed to do.

My advisor recommended Norman Cohn’s Pursuit the Millenium to me, which still is one of my favorite works of history. Cohn wrote about medieval Christian peasants using millenarian ideology to rebel against the Feudal order. His goal was to undermine the Whiggish notion of the Middle Ages where peasants meekly accepted the hierarchal order of their day and it was only during the Enlightenment that people developed a political consciousness. What I took from Cohn is the idea that messianism is not just a religious doctrine but also a political ideology. This gave me the idea of writing about Jewish Messianism as something political. This would be going against Gershom Scholem and most Jewish Historians who have seen Judaism from the Destruction of the Second Temple to the rise of Zionism as lacking politics.

My advisor liked my idea for a dissertation but insisted that even this was too narrow and that I needed to also write about parallel examples within Christianity and Islam. Fairly quickly, I found myself trapped in a project that I was not qualified to handle. Furthermore, I was socially isolated where I was living with few dating opportunities. This led me to depression, which in turn, made it difficult to work on the dissertation, which only furthered my depression. My main relief from depression was writing this blog, which most certainly did not mean making progress with the dissertation.  

To be fair to my advisor, he is an excellent teacher and I learned a lot from him. In addition to introducing me to the work of Norman Cohn, he gave me a copy of Keith Thomas' Religion and the Decline of Magic. I still cherish the memories of sitting in his office doing a private study session on Christian mysticism, reading people like St. Teresa de Avila, St. John of the Cross, and Jacob Bohme. I think it was because I held my advisor in such high esteem, that I did not initially blame him for my difficulties, even though I realized after a year or so that I should not have been given a dissertation project like the one he gave me. I simply accepted that he had made an honest mistake and it was my job to plow through and make the best of it.   

 

All Conquests After 1928 are Illegitimate: A Review of the Internationalists

 

The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World by Oona Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro is a book I learned a lot from even as I disagree with its premises. The authors consider our current system of international law to be mostly a positive thing, which they attribute to the 1928 Pact of Paris (also known as Kellogg-Briand). The basic idea of this agreement was to outlaw offensive warfare by declaring that countries needed to refer their disputes to arbitration and that all conquests done after 1928 were not to be recognized by the international community. (By declaring that only future conquests were illegitimate, the pact bypassed the issue of the British and French empires, which were created precisely through the sorts of actions that were now supposed to be illegal.) By implication, the pact granted relevance to international opinion. Now all wars involved the international community as other countries needed to decide whether the agreement had been violated and whether they could recognize new realities on the ground.

The practical implications of this agreement could be seen in the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria. U. S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson refused to recognize Japan's control over Manchuria or the newly proclaimed State of Manchukuo. This struck the Japanese as rather hypocritical as it was hardly obvious how Japan's behavior in Manchuria was any worse than what European imperialists had been doing as a matter of course. Furthermore, Japan still bore bitter memories of Commodore Matthew Perry's diplomacy at gunpoint. Japan's mistake was that they invaded Manchuria three years too late; now there was a new set of rules. 

To be clear, as the authors note, the Pact of Paris did not stop Japan nor any of the other acts of Fascist aggression leading up to World War II. Furthermore, even the judges at Nuremberg ignored an attempt to use the Pact of Paris as a basis for prosecuting Nazi defendants. The idea was that since the actions of Nazi Germany were illegal according to the Pact of Paris, the defendants had no immunity against prosecution. What the authors want to argue is that, despite spending years as mostly a dead letter, in the post-war world, the logic of the Pact of Paris was taken up and became the basis for modern international law. For example, the pact's rejection of territorial expansion meant that, with the notable exception of Poland, international borders changed remarkably little after World War II, particularly if you compare it to World War I. Since World War II, borders have been rather stable and there have been few wars of territorial conquest. It is no longer worth it to conquer territory if the international community will not recognize it.   

For a book that is supposed to be about twentieth-century legal thought, the authors spend quite a lot of time on early modern history. As a foil to modern international law, they set up the seventeenth-century scholar Hugo Grotius. I have long considered Grotius to be one of those proto-Enlightenment thinkers who have been unfairly ignored by the general public. In reading this book, I found myself agreeing with Grotius and thinking that the world would be a much better place if we rejected modern international law and went back to something more along the lines of early modern international law as embodied by Grotius. 

Grotius' seventeenth-century Europe saw the emergence of states as distinct from Christendom or a personal monarchy, with Grotius' native Dutch Republic taking the lead, even as we are still a long way from secular democracies in the modern sense. For Grotius, the state was its own moral entity, distinct from its leaders or population. As such, while Grotius believed that states needed to justify their decisions to go to war, its leaders, population, and even the international community were exempted and even, in practice forbidden, from considering whether the state's justifications were valid. Soldiers fighting a war still had to obey the laws of war and refrain from committing war crimes as these did nothing to bring the war to a conclusion. That being said, they were not asked to be lawyers and historians qualified to evaluate whether their government was in the right. Furthermore, Grotius' version of international law had no third-party enforcement. States that allowed their soldiers to commit atrocities invited retaliation by the opposing army. Finally, since other countries were not expected to be knowledgeable enough to have an opinion about the morality of any particular foreign war, once a treaty was signed, that was the end of the matter. If a country managed to win a war and forced the defeated country to sign away territory in a peace treaty, the new borders must now be accepted by all.

What Hathaway and Shapiro dislike about Grotius is that his type of international law opened the door for all kinds of wars of expansion, with states coming up with factitious reasons to go to war without any oversight and then holding on to their ill-gotten gains. The authors point to the young Grotius working as a lawyer for the Dutch East India Company and defending the seizure of a Portuguese ship, seeing in this the foundation for his later work on international law. 

One of the examples the authors give of countries fighting according to Grotius' international law was the Mexican-American War of 1846-48. President Polk could declare war against Mexico over claims of unpaid debts that few people took seriously even at the time. American soldiers were required to obey their orders and not consult their consciouses. Similarly, the international community had no mandate to consider whether this was a war of aggression and if they had an obligation to intervene. Finally, the morality of Polk's declaration was forever placed beyond challenge by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which gave the American Southwest to the United States. Whether or not the United States had the right to conquer this territory, it now belonged to the United States and attempting to take it away would violate international law. 

Surprisingly enough, Grotius had a direct influence on Japan and its justifications for imperialism. In the nineteenth century, Japanese scholars started reading Grotius as a blueprint for how to operate in the world. Japan was emerging into a world dominated by European countries who had certain understandings between themselves. If Japan was going to be a great power they needed to know what these rules were. Grotius, as the father of international law, seemed to offer them the key. This seemed to work until they invaded Manchuria and they discovered that the rules had changed.  

For all their criticism of Grotius, Hathaway and Shapiro fail to consider the practical benefit of Grotius' willingness to place the question of whether a state was right to go to war in a kind of moral black box. By not demanding that citizens have the right answer as to the morality of their country's war, we protect those citizens. Their country might be in the wrong, but we are still going to grant rights to the soldiers fighting this immoral war and even the politicians. This facilitates limiting the scope of the war and working toward a peace treaty. Allowing even immoral treaties forced upon a weaker power to stand also helps to support peace. We do not want to be refighting every morally questionable war, whether the Mexican-American War or any other war. 

Considering the amount of knowledge required to settle historically based disagreements between countries, modern international law seems designed to promote a regime of international elites, who are simply going to confirm their prejudices as to which country is right in any given dispute. The use of the International Criminal Court against Israel is a good example of this. Those making the case seem willfully blind to the question of what Israel needs to do in order to avoid another October 7th. The moment we consider military necessity, the whole trial would have to be postponed until after the war when Israeli generals would be free to answer questions about their decisions without compromising ongoing military operations.

Hathaway and Shapiro actually discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an example of the limits of the Paris Peace Pact. Neither the State of Israel nor Palestine existed in 1928 so the pact is useless for deciding borders. Worse, because the pact does not allow for conquest, it leaves us without a framework for a treaty. Any borders agreed to would be open to future challenges as the product of a forced treaty and, therefore, illegitimate. Having Grotius as our model for international law would allow the Palestinians to say that Israel wronged us but we lost the war and now need to move on and make peace.    

Genocide, Ecocide, and, Christopher Columbus

  

I was recently helping a student with an assignment on putting Christopher Columbus on trial. The student struck me as reasonably intelligent and without any strong political axes to grind. My basic pitch to them was that there are good arguments to make against Columbus but he was not a simple cartoon villain. I asked them if they had ever heard of Howard Zinn, the primary influence for this particular assignment. They had not. This is in keeping with my general experience with students. They do not know who Zinn was even when copies of his People’s History of the United States are on their classroom bookshelves and posters with his quotes are on the walls. As counter-intuitive as this may sound, I do not take this as good news. These students are so thoroughly in Zinn classrooms that they are unable to imagine an alternative. Zinn as the author of a book can be countered by simply pointing out that there are other perspectives. Admittedly, this is assuming that the individual has not turned Zinn into scripture. Part of what makes Zinn so dangerous is that he presents himself as offering Gnostic knowledge as to the “true” nature of the United States. This means that, if you disagree with Zinn, you are by definition, one of the “unenlightened” or even the “Satanic” so your arguments can be dismissed out of hand.

What struck me as particularly interesting was that the text framed the charges explicitly in terms of modern concepts like genocide and ecocide as opposed to charges that would have meant something to someone in the sixteenth century like the violation of Natural Law and just war theory. Genocide and ecocide are such new concepts that we are still in the process of establishing what they even are. To be clear, this does not mean that these concepts are illegitimate. On the contrary, much hinges on our ability to incorporate them into a meaningful legal framework. This takes time and careful thought as opposed to throwing these terms around to make yourself sound sophisticated and socially conscious. 

No one has made any serious attempt to prosecute someone for ecocide so we really have no idea what such a charge would look like if brought to a court of law in the twenty-first century let alone to accuse someone in the sixteenth century, before anyone even thought in terms of humans being able to harm something as abstract as the environment. Even in the case of genocide, we are still in the beginning stages of establishing precedents to make it a meaningful crime. Contrast this with an established crime like first-degree murder, where all parties basically agree with the meaning of the charge, leaving the only question as to what the facts are. No defendant is going to get away with claiming that murder is legal.

Making sure that even the defendant recognizes that what they are accused of is actually a crime is important in order to establish a mens rea, a guilty mind. To get a conviction, the defendant needed to have known that what they were doing was illegal in some sense. For example, an essential part of the Nuremberg Trial was that the Nazi defendants knew that what they were doing was in violation of standards and norms of conduct and would invite retribution from the international community if they were caught. Otherwise, they would not have covered up their atrocities during the war and then denied any knowledge of them happening afterward. Without this, prosecutors could not have gotten around the fact that the entire trial was in violation of the principle of ex post facto as the defendants had not violated any clearly defined statutes.   

The recent ICJ charges against Israel are a good example of the problems facing anyone trying to make genocide a meaningful crime. Putting aside what one thinks about Israel’s actions in Gaza, does anyone honestly believe that this trial is really about the war with Hamas as opposed to the question of Israel’s right to exist? Until you can distinguish the two, no genocide trial is going to carry legitimacy.

Murder is a meaningful concept because it is an objective claim that can be disconnected from what anyone thinks of the rightfulness of the perpetrator’s action. For example, I may believe that it is moral to shoot an actual white supremacist like Richard Spencer and not simply punch him. That being said, such an action would be murder, however noble the cause. As such, as a juror, I would be obligated to vote guilty even though I would find myself agreeing with the defendant.

If legal professionals are still working out the details as to what counts as genocide and to distinguish it from what they personally think of the defendant, how are high school students supposed to do any better? One suspects, that part of the point of this exercise is to ingrain into students the anti-law belief that being guilty of a crime is all a matter of whether you like someone and agree with their morality. This is the natural way for humans to think. Unless it is actively educated out of people, we are left with not a legal system but a collection of warring tribes pursuing vendettas against each other. 

This use of contemporary terms to denounce Columbus is all the more frustrating because, if you want to teach students about Spanish atrocities in the New World in a meaningful way, there is no need to bring in concepts that we, let alone sixteenth-century Spaniards, do not yet understand. Instead, we can bring in concepts such as Natural Law and just war theory, which were widely understood at the time.

Sixteenth-century Europeans did not simply believe that they were superior to everyone else and could do with them as they pleased. Medieval Natural Law Theory, which Christians developed out of the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, took as its starting point that ethics, while of divine origin, was something distinct from Christianity. As such, non-Christians had rights even to the point that non-Christians could be legitimate rulers with the ability to demand the obedience of Christians. For example, Jesus implied that one should pay taxes to the Romans. While medieval Natural Law assumed hierarchy with a king at the top and everyone else their subjects, the king had obligations to his subjects. As for foreigners, the king could not simply wage war, even against non-Christians, without a legitimate cause and once he conquered a land, the people, once they submitted themselves, became his subjects whose rights must be protected.

This is a useful lens to understand Spanish activity because it quickly became clear that the actions of many Spaniards in the New World violated Natural Law and many Europeans were horrified by what they heard. This included Ferdinand and Isabella, who saw Native Americans as their subjects whom they were obligated to protect both physically and spiritually. Far be it for me to want to defend Ferdinand and Isabella who were morally responsible for the deaths of thousands of Jews during their expulsion from Spain in 1492. That being said, it is difficult to hold them responsible for what happened to Native Americans.

Introducing students to Natural Law and just war theory would have the advantage of helping them get into the heads of early modern Europeans so we could have a meaningful conversation as to what it meant to move from a medieval framework to the Enlightenment without falling into the Whiggish trap of assuming that this meant going from religious fanaticism to becoming a rational tolerant individual. 

Imagine that you are an educated European hearing about Native Americans for the first time. You might ask if they have governments, property, and marriage, which would establish them as “civilized” even if they are not Christians and greatly limit the right of Europeans to colonize their lands. For example, the Japanese, whom Europeans are soon going to encounter for the first time, are, even if they are not Christians, obviously civilized and, unlike Muslims, have no history of making war against Christians. As such, beyond sending missionaries and merchants, Europeans need to leave Japan to the Japanese.

Even if Native Americans are not civilized and cannot claim ownership over their land this does not mean that they are subhuman and can be abused at will. On the contrary, it is clear that they deserve protection and Europeans should help them become civilized. It would be difficult to teach them about Christianity unless they have already embraced the framework of European civilization and understand Natural Law, without which Christian doctrines like Original Sin make no sense.

It quickly becomes clear that not all Native Americans are the same. Some are warlike and brutal, a threat to Europeans and natives alike. The obvious solution is to fight the “bad” natives and protect the “good” ones. Unfortunately, it also becomes clear that many of the Spaniards who have come to the New World are nothing better than thieves and murderers. (The fact that people in the sixteenth century violated the moral code as they understood it on a regular basis should be no more surprising than seeing people today violate the moral code as we understand it.) Acknowledging the existence of  “bad” Spaniards means that it is hard to tell the difference between the “good” natives who are merely fighting to protect themselves and the “bad” natives motivated by greed and a desire to kill. How about we send godly friers to help form native communities? The good intentions of these friars can be seen from the fact that they are risking their lives to come to America and preach the gospel to the natives without any hope of material gain. The friers will control the soldiers by reminding them of their Christian duty. The friendly natives should want to join of their own free will to learn European ways and become Christians. Those who do not want to join can assumed to be hostile.

All of this sounds reasonable until you realize that the biggest threat to Native Americans was never European guns and steel but the germs Europeans unknowingly carried. An important lesson that I want my students to take away is that millions of Native Americans died despite European good intentions. My students may mean well and their ideas might still end up killing millions for reasons that are beyond their comprehension.    

Contrary to popular myth, pre-modern Europeans did not believe that they were superior to other people. They knew better. It was the Enlightenment that pretended to have discovered the fact that China was an advanced civilization that had developed useful insights regarding ethics. This was somehow supposed to refute Christianity even though Christians had never denied this fact. One could not have been a scholastic who admired Greco-Roman thought without being aware of this. On the contrary, Natural Law is premised on the assumption that one can develop an advanced society with an ethical system without Christianity. It was because our ancient Greco-Roman pagans were basically decent people that they recognized that they fell short of the ethical principles that they knew were true. This led many of them to become Christians in the first place as they felt they needed atonement. It should be noted that Protestants are going to turn against this Natural Law tradition precisely because it so readily conceded that humans could be good, at least a little bit, without believing in Jesus. In this, Protestants ended up accidentally bringing about the Enlightenment.

The only advantage that pre-modern Europeans believed they had was Christianity, which allowed them to go to heaven. They knew that they were not more advanced than other people. It was only once we get to the eighteenth century that Europeans have a decisive edge over everyone else. It is only at this point that Europeans could even begin to ask the question of why they had this advantage and conclude that it actually had something to do with them being somehow superior. It should be noted that for Adam Smith the European advantage was solely due to social and legal systems and not any innate European abilities.

If you were a Native American running into a European who was in the process of dropping the medieval Natural Law model in favor of the Enlightenment, there might be certain advantages but also risks. Our Enlightened European may be in the process of developing a notion of human rights that is unconnected to being part of a political system. Under the influence of Rousseau, our European might look to you as a model of innate human goodness untainted by civilization or Christianity. On the flip side though, unmooring our European from Natural Law and its emphasis on personal relationships is going to limit their sense of obligation to those they have power over. If Native Americans are suffering it must be because they are "unenlightened savages," something that Europeans bear no responsibility for. Prioritizing natives as economic assets or, worse, bodies occupying useful land over souls in need of salvation is going to limit any incentive to treat Native Americans with decency. Most importantly, the Enlightenment had not yet solved the epidemiological problem that turned first contacts into death traps for Native Americans.   

 

Voyaging Into Jewish History

 

Previously, I explored Haredi education through an Abie Rotenberg song. I would like to continue to use Abie Rotenberg to better understand Jewish thought. The song "Journey at Sea" from the album Journeys Five stands as a useful introduction to a traditional view of Jewish History. To be clear, by history here, what I mean is not so much the particular facts about the past but the narrative framework in which we place those facts. Admittedly, part of the song's charm is that it never explicitly says anything about Judaism. If I had heard this song on a Celtic album I would have simply thought that this was a solid song. What follows is my interpretation. You have the ship of Judaism crewed by the faithful and led by wise captain rabbis. It sails on the Sea of Galus (exile). The goal is at some point to reach the port of messianic redemption, but that is of little day-to-day relevance when compared to living as a religious Jew. The challenge of sailing on the Sea of Galus is that inevitably you are going to run into storms that threaten to destroy Judaism either through physical violence or through assimilation. 

It should be noted that the captain and the crew are fundamentally passive figures as events play themselves out. They have absorbed enough of Jewish History to recognize that storms are on the horizon and take measures, presumably the strengthening of Jewish practice, to give themselves a chance of getting through the storm with the ship intact. That being said, no one on the ship ever tries to stop storms from happening. Such actions are presumed to be beyond their power and, therefore foolhardy to pursue. All that is left is to recognize that they have limited power and seek to act only within their means. 

This view of Jewish History has not been limited to Orthodox writers. For example, Heinrich Graetz's Jewish History is famously an exercise in a lachrymose narrative in which Jews suffer and think. There is a reason why Rabbi Berel Wein was able to so easily take Graetz and give him a more religious spin. Graetz's basic narrative remained a fundamentally traditional one in which Judaism managed to survive outside threats even as, for Graetz, Judaism meant something slightly different from Orthodox writers, mainly nothing involving Kabbalah or Hasidism.    

An essential point to understand about political Zionism (whether secular or religious) is that it rejected our traditional model of Jewish History. One thinks of the example of Benzion Netanyahu's biography of Isaac Abarbanel. Netanyahu could never forgive Abarbanel for having been caught by surprise by 1492 and for having no real solution to the problem of expulsion beyond apocalypticism. If Jews had a state of their own, then Jews would not have had to ask themselves the question of what are they to do if they were faced with expulsion or pogroms as Jews living in a Jewish State would not be under the power of gentiles. Similarly, at a spiritual level, Jews would not have had to worry about making themselves acceptable to gentiles and refashioning Judaism to suit gentile tastes. Instead, Jews could have focused on the development of a genuinely Jewish culture. From this perspective, traditional Jewish History, with its emphasis on bracing to be hit in the hope of being able to stand back up again, was a colossal mistake that needed to be fixed.     

It should be appreciated that the State of Israel was founded in 1948 at a time when the traditional model of Jewish History seemed to have reached a dead end. This was in the wake of the Holocaust when a modern state like Germany decided to invest its full efforts in murdering all Jews under its control. Furthermore, neither the United States and certainly not the Soviet Union could stand as plausible candidates for flourishing Jewish life, particularly when being Jewish now meant facing the possibility of something like the Holocaust. Under such circumstances, it seemed unlikely that Judaism could survive without a Jewish State that would physically protect Jews and offer them a space to be productive citizens without abandoning their Jewish identity. In judging the State of Israel over the past seventy-five years, it is a fair question to consider to what extent it has offered a legitimate alternative to traditional Jewish History.

In understanding the traditional narrative of Jewish History, it is useful to also pay attention to the song's chorus: "It's our life a journey at sea, a voyage of fate and destiny." What has allowed Jews to even try to survive as Jews has been a belief that there really was no other way of life available to them. To be a religious Jew has meant believing that God has a literal plan for history that requires Jewish survival so he will not allow the Jewish people to disappear. If you are a Jew, you will always be a Jew and God, often acting through gentiles, will never allow you to escape your Judaism no matter how hard you try. Even for those Jews who formally reject such theology, the basic model of seeing the world can be hard to shake.   

 

Ground Rules for a Discourse With Me

 

In an earlier post, I explored why I felt I had an easier time reading conservative Christians than woke leftists. The practical implication of this is that I recognize that I struggle to engage people on the left. I am open to the possibility that this is a failure on my part that I need to rectify. Readers should feel free to offer book recommendations or to attempt to engage me in dialogue. For a fruitful conversation to happen, I suspect that there are going to need to be ground rules. 

1. People on the mainstream right today are not responsible for racism: 

We can still acknowledge that there are real problems today facing various minority communities and, recognizing the historical sources of these problems as well as a need for Americans to come together, there may be a need for government solutions; this may even include direct reparation payments. That being said, the very act of reaching out to conservatives to help in solving the problem means that you are not blaming them for racism. This would apply even if we are mainly asking conservatives to write a check. Even asking conservatives for money is distinct from trying to punish conservatives by making them pay. With punishment, there is no dialogue, just a demand and a threat of what might happen if that demand is not met. 

2. There will be no tearing down of present-day systems: 

We may acknowledge that the political and social systems we have inherited contain deeply problematic elements that need to be reformed. Furthermore, an important aspect of how we teach history should be an open and honest exploration of the skeletons in our collective closet. That being said, it should be acknowledged that any attempt to completely tear these systems down is likely to bring about extreme bloodshed and what is likely to arise will be more authoritarian than anything we have today. It may still be possible to argue that those people unfairly victimized by the system should be compensated in order that they do not harm the rest of society by turning toward revolution.  

3. As a general principle, capitalism/free markets should be acknowledged as superior to government action on both moral and practical grounds: 

There can still be room for government action under specific circumstances such as providing public goods or compensating people for past iniquities. That being said, there is going to be no unwritten constitution where the government is deemed as "people coming together" and markets as mere greed. Government must be acknowledged as a literal act of physical violence, leaving us with the question only of how much can we minimize its use without causing the collapse of civilization.   

4. There must be red lines on the left:

Historically, as Jordan Peterson has argued, the mainstream right has understood that there were lines, mainly Nazism/racism, that should not be crossed. This has not been the case with the left. Consider the example of Che Guevera. It is not socially acceptable, within polite society, to wear a Himmler t-shirt; how is it ok to wear a Che Guevara shirt? Underlying such social rules is a double standard regarding Communism. Communists get a pass for their ideals and are not held responsible for the millions of deaths they have caused. The fact that Nazis also were idealists gets ignored. We can talk about where to draw these lines to the left, just as we can talk about where the right needs to draw its lines, but such lines must still exist.    

For a meaningful dialogue to happen, I need to believe that you are not planning to kill me. As such, I need to feel confident that you are not going to demand something that I must refuse even at the risk of my life. The reality is that there are going to be people (such as Nazis and Communists) that I am unlikely to be able to live with and having me live in the same country as them is likely to lead to Hobbesian Civil War. I do wish to be able to live with others, even those I disagree with, and to do so I am willing to make compromises but compromise needs to be a two-way street.   

Coming Out of the Closet to Claim Group Rights

Essential for understanding African American history in this country is the fact that, for hundreds of years blacks were persecuted as a group. It was not just that blacks were disproportionally targeted for slavery, lynchings, and ultimately the system of Jim Crow, these things were part of an organized conspiracy against black people for the simple reason that they were black. By the end of the 18^th century, whites had developed the sense that the new United States was founded as a white man’s republic and therefore required a rigid distinction between whites and blacks that kept blacks in a subordinate position. This racism served a practical purpose in that it gave American whites, who otherwise did not have much in common with each other a sense that they were bonded into a common project. (This is not to defend American racism. On the contrary, this is a reason to take racists seriously and not as mere rhetoric.) This belief in America as a white man’s republic obviously existed in a dialectic with the belief in America as the country of “all men are created equal.” It is to America’s credit that, in the long march of history, the belief in all men are created equal has tended to win out over the white man’s republic.

The fact that African-Americans have been persecuted as a group is important because it establishes at least hypothetical grounds for blacks to make demands from white society that go beyond the elimination of laws that outright discriminated against blacks. The fact that I have personally never owned slaves and no African American alive today has ever been formally enslaved in this country does not mean that I do not owe something to African Americans. As critical race theorists would argue, I have benefited from systemic racism. Perhaps I should be willing to accept non-discrimination laws applied to private businesses, affirmative action, or even allow for my tax dollars to fund reparations?

To be clear, there is a risk in having blacks pushing the claim to be a distinct group as the traditional argument for their civil rights rested on the premise that blacks were not really a group. On the contrary, the idea was supposed to be that the notion that the color of a person’s skin could affect a person’s identity was a ridiculous notion invented by foolish racists. If blacks are going to be so reckless as to undermine the entire case for their civil rights and claim that they really are different from white people, they might be left to reap the consequences.

It is interesting to compare the case for black civil rights to LGBTQ+ rights as it is hardly obvious that LGBTQ+ people can actually claim to be a group let alone a historically persecuted one. For one thing, their opponents generally tend not to see them as members of a group but simply as people engaged in an action. It is that action that is the source of the opposition.

Furthermore, LGBTQ+ people are not, in any obvious way born LGBTQ+. We can say that black is a meaningful group in large part because we can accept that a newborn can, in some real sense, be classified as black. (We can go around a maternity ward and point to the black, white, Asian, and Hispanic babies and say that they are all beautiful in God's eyes and that it is wonderful to have such diversity.) What does it mean to say that a newborn is LGBTQ+. Think of it this way; how many black teenagers have undergone the experience of coming “out of the closet” to their parents? “Mom and Dad, I want you to know that I am black.” To which the parents respond: “Are you sure that you are black. Maybe, if you listened to more country music, you will become white.” LGBTQ+ people historically have not been raised by LGBTQ+ parents with an LGBTQ+ identity. It would seem that this is merely something that they decide for themselves. As such, it should make no wider claims on heterosexuals beyond the right to be left alone.  

Consider the consequences of coming out at an even later point in life. It is hardly obvious that a forty-year-old man who comes out of the closet has really discovered his “true identity” that he has been hiding, perhaps even from himself, all along. On the contrary, this sounds like someone going through a mid-life crisis that has led them to take on a "new hobby." Such behavior should be tolerated with amusement but there is no need to grant the person any kind of moral support for they have not done anything virtuous. Note that this all assumes that our middle-aged out of the closet gay person has not abandoned a wife and children to pursue his gay lifestyle. If he has then he is liable for social condemnation and possibly even legal penalties.

If LGBTQ+ people are not a group then they cannot make a claim to be persecuted as a group. For that matter, it would not be possible for them to be discriminated against. To be clear, I agree that anti-sodomy laws were wrong as they violated personal liberty. Then again, I believe with equal conviction that drug laws are wrong. This is not because they discriminate against potheads and keep them from becoming their true high selves. I do not accept that Pothead counts as a meaningful group. Human beings should have the right to ingest substances. Similarly, human beings should have the right to engage in consensual adult acts whether it is sodomy or incest. To be clear, in none of these cases should the right to engage in an action be confused with a right to a job or to social respectability.   

Something that I find fascinating about the LGBTQ+ movement is how they have managed to turn what should be an argument against them in their favor. It is argued that the fact that LGBTQ+ people are usually not raised with an LGBTQ+ identity is one of the ways that they are persecuted. LGBTQ+ people grow up "deprived" of their "authentic" selves. They have to struggle against a heteronormative society that tries to inflict heteronormativity upon them tempting them to live "inauthentically." From this perspective, even the progressive parent who never consciously attempts to stop their child from assuming an LGBTQ+ identity is still guilty of anti-LGBTQ+ persecution merely for raising the kid in an "inauthentic" fashion on the assumption that they are heterosexual or cisgender. This is sort of like the frum-novel trope where the Jewish kid is raised by Gentiles who try to keep the "truth" of his Judaism from him only for his "Jewish spark" to shine through in the end. (Note that the claims of an authentic LGBTQ+ self and an authentic Jewish self are both metaphysical claims. As such, the First Amendment would require that the government take them as equally valid.)   

A practical policy implication of this argument that LGBTQ+ people are a group even to the point of claiming that LGBTQ+ kids exist, is a push to bring LGBTQ+ material into schools. The goal is to teach kids about LGBTQ+ practices but, more than that, they wish to teach that LGBTQ+ people are a legitimate group with the moral high ground due to their "authentic" living earned by struggling against the constraints of a persecuting culture. This leaves children with an obvious question: might they really be LGBTQ+? If they come out as such, they will be praised for showing the "courage" to be their "authentic" selves. The more there are children who can be convinced to do this, the easier it becomes to argue that LGBTQ+ people really are a group. If children really are born LGBTQ+ and only needed adults to give them the language and the support structure to come out of the closet in ways that are in "no way manipulative," then being LGBTQ+ must be a legitimate identity. As such, society must not only eliminate all laws that ban LGBTQ+ practices but also "atone" for the crime of not previously recognizing that such an identity existed. 

Arguably, this would require greater government action than rectifying American racism. Consider, blacks have never had to seriously struggle against people who refused to accept that there was such a thing as black people in the genetic sense. For LGBTQ+ people to receive their full rights as a group, it might be necessary, regardless of the First Amendment, that everyone must be forced to acknowledge that they really are a group. 

Does Reading Make Someone Less Likely to Be Evil?

 

"I know that having a good vocabulary doesn't guarantee that I'm a good person," the boy said. "But it does mean I've read a great deal. And in my experience, well-read people are less likely to be evil." ...

There are, of course, plenty of evil people who have read a great many books, and plenty of very kind people who seem to have found some other method of spending their time. But the Baudelaires knew that there was a kind of truth to the boy's statement, and they had to admit that they preferred to take their chances with a stranger who knew what the word "xenial" meant, ... (Slippery Slope, p. 95-96).

I confess that would I be more willing to trust someone who knew what xenial meant or, for that matter, had read Lemony Snicket's A Series of Unfortunate Events. This is because they have something in common with me. As such, it is plausible to imagine that they would be able to better empathize with me, which would make it harder for them to betray me. Of course, this line of thinking can easily be manipulated by con artists, who know that they can trick people into trusting them by convincing them that they have the same taste in art or religion or belong to the same ethnic group.  

Does reading actually help make someone less likely to be evil? If you are a humanities person, whose life and profession center around books, there is much at stake in being able to claim that this is so. Consider the question, are plumbers less likely to be evil? The issue is irrelevant as society requires plumbers in order to function regardless of their moral quality. If studying to become a plumber had the same effect on one's moral development as spending a year on Korriban communing with the force spirits of ancient Sith Lords then so be it. It is not so obvious that society needs history and literature teachers if we cannot assume that they will contribute to the moral development of students. As such, those of us in these professions need to either be able to make a convincing case that we promote morality or confess that what we do is merely a hobby for people of leisure, much the same as gardening or video games.   

This renders book readers vulnerable to moral hazard. People's actual morality is likely to be inversely proportional to their belief in their morality. The more you think that you are a good person, the more likely you are going to be willing to justify doing bad things to your opponents. If they oppose you, they must be bad people who deserve what is coming to them. Why should a few bad people be allowed to stand in the way of all the wonderful things a good person such as yourself can do for the world? How truly dangerous must a person be whose sense of self is wrapped around books and needs to believe that these books have made them better people? 

The moral hazard goes even further. If people who read are morally superior then it makes sense that they should rule over the plumbers as philosopher kings. This goes to the heart of liberal arts. Historically, liberal meant "free." The liberal arts were those things that could be studied by the wealthy leisure class, who did not have to worry about developing a useful trade. To engage with the liberal arts itself was a justification to rule. The aristocrat, freed from the constraints of earning a living and allowed to study things simply to develop their souls, deserved to rule. Since they did not need to worry about money and personal gain, they could act for the "common good," which they learned through the liberal arts. This aristocratic ethos was later embraced by Roussoueauians and eventually Marxists. Neither of these ideologies are really about empowering the people or the working class. They are defenses for rule by intellectuals.    

There is a plausible case to be made that reading helps people expand their circle of empathy. Reading fiction and history allows one to enter the heads of people who are different from ourselves and recognize their humanity. If you can be emotionally moved by space aliens, perhaps you can be moved by the plight of refugees or even your next-door neighbor. This ability to empathize, though, would still require that the reader not believe that their reading is making them more empathetic. Otherwise, we fall back down the moral hazard hole, leaving us merely with someone who knows how to employ the rhetoric of empathy to claim the moral high ground and the right to rule. 

Has reading made me a better person? I enjoy reading as a means of coming to a better understanding of the world around me. My self-education through books has continued even after I failed to earn my doctorate when I could no longer assume that books would lead me to a position of respect and authority. Perhaps, my reading can be defended on the grounds that it has saved me from the sin of worldly ambition. Regardless, I will return to my joyously Sisyphean quest to get through my ever-expanding reading list.    

The Rights of Chazerphiles, Chazerexuals and the Chazerphobes Who Might Still Love Them

It should come as no surprise to my readers that I have never eaten chazor (pig). It is not just that I happen to have never tried pork. A major aspect of my identity as a Jew is my active refusal to eat pork. Since I lack positive cultural associations for pig and it is symbolic of so much of the "other" for me, you might even say that I am mildly "chazerphopic." Obviously, most of the world does not share my chazerphobia. In fact, there are many "chazerphiles," people for whom the active eating of pork is a critical part of their identity in much the same way that a critical part of my identity is not eating pork. Think of all those Americans for whom the holidays would be incomplete without their Christmas ham. Presumably, there are even ideological chazerphiles who consciously eat pork as a means of rejecting the God of the Hebrew Bible. Such people may view chazerphobes like myself as a threat to the building of a godless society and resent the idea that I "force" my chazerphobic lifestyle upon my children, depriving them not only of the delicious taste of pork but also of the freedom to not worry about whether some "old man in the sky" cares about what they eat.   

As a classical liberal, I acknowledge that both chazerphobes like myself and the chazerphiles who make up the majority of society have rights. I cannot use direct physical force to stop anyone, Jewish or otherwise, from enjoying pork to their heart's content. As a practical matter, I believe that the State of Israel should eliminate all restrictions on the selling and consumption of pigs. At the same time, we should be able to agree that I have the right to keep a kosher home free of pigs. Things get a little more complicated as we deal with cases in the middle and reasonable people of goodwill are going to disagree over where precisely to draw the lines between protecting the rights of chazerphiles and chazerphobes. Among other things, this will depend upon whether we assume that pork eating is simply something that some people like to do or whether some people might actually be "chazerexuals" and eating pork is inherent to their very being? If the latter, then my chazerphobia might be deemed an act of hate against these chazerexuals that threatens their very lives. My chazerphobia should be given only the barest tolerance as some moral failing that I can indulge in the privacy of my home. I should have the decency to be embarrassed by my intolerant mindset and should make no attempt to expose my children or anyone else's to such a backward belief.  

I am raising my two boys in a non-pig-consuming home. When they become adults and move out of my house, they are free to make their own choices, including becoming hardcore chazerphiles. What if they come out of the closet to me as chazerexuals and demand that I respect them for who they are by taking them to McDonald's, even going so far as to threaten to harm themselves, God forbid, if I fail to comply? If we do not believe that chazerexuals actually exist (as opposed to people who simply really like eating pork), then I can dismiss them as being insane and I am under no obligation to indulge the delusions of crazy people. I am not endangering their physical health by not enabling their pork consumption. If, God forbid, they end up harming themselves then it would not be my fault. It is the fault of the mental illness and of any teachers or social media influencers who gave them the idea that they might be chazerexuals with the right to expect that other people will adapt themselves to suit their choice of identity.       

For the past year, I have been teaching in the Los Angeles school system. Do I have the right to tell Jewish students that it is a sin to eat pork? Do I have the right to wear a yarmulka, which might make a Jewish student feel guilty and inhibit their pork consumption? Be careful or I might ask whether a chazerphile teacher has the right to read students books that portray pork eating in a positive light or actively help Jewish students get over their inhibitions about eating pork? 

What if my school wishes to hold a chazer-pride month with a wide variety of activities designed to teach people that it is ok to eat whatever kind of ethically slaughtered meat they like. In truth, I would really wish to cooperate. My chazerphobia is really quite mild. It is not as if I have any truly intellectual objections to eating pig. As a Maimonidean, if I were to create my own religion, I would include some taboos on meat but the meat I would ban would simply be one that the ethnic group I was trying to teach about God was already inclined not to eat. As such, I would have no problem declaring pigs to be "kosher" and banning some other animal. 

I am inclined to believe that all people would do well to follow the ways of their ancestors. As such, it makes sense that non-Jewish Mexicans should maintain their ancestral customs and stick pork into everything. I would wish to support them in this endeavor. 

As part of the school community, I would want to take part in chazer-pride in any way I could. I would be willing to wear a shirt with the chazor-pride logo and march with the other teachers in the chazor-pride parade. It even seems reasonable, assuming my rabbi would permit it, to make a contest that if my students read x number of pages I would agree to personally roast a pig on a spit with an apple in its mouth. 

For me to cooperate with chazerphiles like this, though, I have to honestly believe that they support my chazerphobia and are not conspiring to undermine the keeping of kosher. In this, it is important to keep in mind the halakhic concept of "shas ha-shmad." One is allowed to violate most commandments if someone threatens to kill you but in a time where there is an organized plan to destroy Judaism, you need to be willing to die even over petty things like shoelaces. For example, normally you are allowed to eat pork to save your life. That being said, during the Antiochian persecutions of the second-century b.c.e., the Seleucid authorities tried to get as many Jews as they could to eat pork as part of their plan to destroy Judaism. Pork-eating Jews were being proclaimed as having rejected the God of Israel. The casual Jew on the street, upon seeing pious Jews agreeing to eat pork, would conclude that it was ok to simply throw away all of Judaism. As such, it became necessary for there to be truly committed Jews willing to pay the ultimate price to demonstrate that they still followed the God of Israel. If there were some Jews willing to die for kosher then the majority of Jews might still be willing to try to keep kosher even if it was just in their homes.

If the chazerphiles in charge of my school made no attempt to pressure me in participating in chazer-pride and made it clear that I would face no consequences for openly opposing chazer-pride, I would be inclined to be as cooperative as my rabbinic authorities would allow me. What if the school would declare that chazerexuals existed and needed to be supported to the extent that anyone who refused to celebrate chazer-pride by not putting on the chazer-pride logo was guilty of hating chazerexuals? What if I suspected that the chazerphile administrators, in their desire to build a "community for all" and not offer a home to "hatred" of any sort, would retaliate if I refused to wear the chazer-pride logo? If the chazer-pride logo is something so important as to threaten my job over, it must be because the chazerphiles actually have an ideological agenda such as a wish to undermine the keeping of kosher. If observant Jews like me can be bullied into wearing the chazer-pride logo then the less religious will come to the conclusion that it is ok to eat the chazer-pride roasted pig on a spit. 

Under such circumstances, I would feel compelled to actively oppose chazer-pride even if it cost me my job. I may not believe that chazerexuals really exist, but those who claim to be deserve empathy even though they should not be encouraged in their delusions. I love and respect chazorphiles and do not wish to stop them from enjoying pork. That being said, I am a Jew and, as a Jew, I am proudly chazerphobic. I oppose Jews eating pork for no rational reason at all. I simply believe that Jews eating pork would not be consistent with the will of the creator and prime mover of the universe. 

 

Tolerating People Who Happen to Have Red Hair: An Explosive Problem

 

The argument that I am about to make can, to some degree or another, be applied to any minority group and not just redheads. This certainly includes people like myself who are Jewish and on the autism spectrum. There should be no mistake; the argument here is sound but it is undoubtedly a hand grenade that can take out anyone, particularly the person foolish enough to try wielding it. Besides the importance of a strong sense of individual rights, the other important lesson that I would hope that readers take from this exercise is that giving people the benefit of the doubt is an essential value for a liberal democracy.   

When discussing tolerance, it is important to distinguish between individual tolerance and group tolerance. While a happy medium is theoretically possible, any attempt to argue for tolerance for individuals is going to be undermined the moment we begin to think of these individuals as members of groups that are distinct from the political community as a whole.  

Take the example of hair color. Readers may recall the Sherlock Holmes story of the Red-Headed League where the villain tricks his redheaded employer into believing in the existence of an organization that gives money to redheads. This fraud is perpetrated in order to get the employer out of his shop for several hours every day, allowing the villain to dig a tunnel across the street into the vault of a bank. The humor of the story lies in the fact that it is patently absurd that some wealthy person would so identify himself with his red hair that he would leave his fortune to benefit total strangers simply because they share his hair color. 

Imagine that our society would suddenly develop a prejudice against redheads and passed laws that segregated people with red hair into separate schools, limited their employment opportunities, and forbade them to marry non-redheads. Fairly quickly, there would develop a community of red-haired people, who gather together because the rest of society rejects them. Other redheads would attempt to cover their red hair in order to operate within general society. For example, someone like me might diligently shave every day to cover the red streaks in his beard and get a signed and notarized document attesting to the fact that all of his grandparents were pure non-redheads. This would likely create further prejudices against redheads as they would be transformed into an unseen menace attempting to infiltrate "respectable" society. Now, non-redheads, in order to not become "tainted" with redheadedness, must be constantly on guard and check their friends and neighbors to make sure that they are not secret redheads. 

The obvious argument against discrimination against redheads is that there really is no such thing as redheads but only individual people who just happen to have hair with a red pigment. Having red hair does not interfere with being a citizen in a liberal democratic society. People with red hair can make use of their reason to faithfully hold public offices from juror to president and serve in the military. 

This is a powerful argument for legal equality but it comes at a price, mainly that we assume that redheads really are just a collection of individuals who happen to have red hair and that there really is no such thing as a redheaded collective. The moment we begin to suspect that red hair stands as a proxy for actual cultural differences and even for different ways of thinking then we have to ask ourselves whether we think there is actually something valuable about these cultural differences and whether we believe that such people are well suited to operating a liberal democracy alongside non-redheads. 

What can people with red hair do to convince us that there really is no such thing as redheadedness and that they should be granted full rights? Clearly, people with red hair should make a point, as soon as the law and society allow them, of not differentiating themselves from people with other hair colors. An obvious manifestation of this would be large-scale intermarriage. People with red hair should have no objection to marrying people who do not have red hair and be at peace with raising children who do not have red hair and in no way identify with redheadedness. Clearly, people with red hair should not form charitable trusts for the benefit of other people with red hair so no "Red-Headed Leagues." The only exception would be for insisting that people with red hair really are like everyone else and eagerly await the day when the very idea of redheaded organizations will be so unnecessary as to be deserving of parody.  

This lack of redheaded identity should also extend itself to the study of history. While redheaded (name of people who live in the country) history should be taught, it should only be in terms of the history of the persecution of people with red hair and how it came to an end. This history should not be taught in terms of a conflict between peoples of different hair colors. People without red hair should not be treated as villains. On the contrary, examples of non-redheads who worked to fight for redhead rights should be emphasized in order to make sure that non-redheads do not feel guilty and to give them historical figures to relate to. 

Since redheads do not really exist as a distinct group, discussions of the sufferings of people with red hair should be universalized as a lesson on the importance of not judging people based on their hair color. Redheads who insist on remembering their history of persecution and remain mistrustful of non-redheads, insisting instead on redhead solidarity, should be castigated for failing to learn from their own history, making them just as bad as the color supremacists who once persecuted them. Outside of the history of redheads in times and places where they have been persecuted, there should be no general history of redheads. The fact that there have been kings with red hair who lived thousands of years ago in faraway lands (like, perhaps, King David) should be of no interest to contemporary people with red hair. We all agree that people with red hair can become presidents as well as enter into unconstitutional treaties with foreign dictators, sabotage the nation's economy with trade restrictions, and father illegitimate children.  

If redheads are really just individuals with red hair, then there should be no need for culturally responsive teaching for children with red hair. Such kids do not think differently than anyone else as hair color has nothing to do with brain structure. Furthermore, there should be no need for children with red hair to see people who "look like them." The moment advocates for children with red hair start saying otherwise, it stops being obvious why such children should be allowed into regular classrooms in the first place. If these children really are different then, perhaps, they really should be placed in separate classrooms to be with their "own kind."  

To be clear, we can expect non-redheaded people of goodwill to extend redheads some degree of charity and tolerate minor acts of tribalism. This might be out of guilt for the hair colorism of their parents, admiration for redheaded music, literature, cuisine, and comedy, or simply a sense that all of this hair color nonsense will eventually blow over on its own. That being said, at some point, if people with red hair push their tribalism far enough, this spirit of charity will end. Non-redheads will decide that redheads are taking advantage of the liberal nature of the general society, demanding rights as individuals while acting as a tribe and engaging in "reverse hair colorism." 

In essence, any attempt by people with red hair to treat their hair color as something relevant to their lives licenses everyone else to take notice of their hair color and use it against them. The moment someone is different in any meaningful way then the Pandora's Box of better or worse for the functioning of a liberal democracy is irrevocably opened. Think of people with red hair arguing for tolerance as a group as Wiley E. Coyote using a jackhammer on the precipice that he is standing on.   

Contrary to popular belief, tolerance is actually quite difficult in a liberal democracy. In contrast, for example, to a monarchy ruling over a diverse collection of people's running their own day-to-day affairs, in a democracy your neighbor who is not like you gets to vote on issues that directly affect your life. Furthermore, classical liberalism implies a commitment to a set of values that have historically been far from ubiquitous within human societies. A liberal democracy in which there are groups that lack a baseline commitment to liberal values will quickly turn into a sucker's game leading to political collapse. If we do not believe that redheads really support individualism and private property for all people, regardless of their hair color, but are simply using liberal democracy and the tolerance of the general society to advance their particular agenda then we will have no choice but to embrace our own non-redhead identity at the expense of building a country for everyone. 

 

Gone With the Master Narrative

In history, one constantly has to pay attention to who writes a source and what their interests are. This is not a value judgment. All sources have their limitations to some degree or another. This is why we engage in counter-reading. We are skeptical about anything that serves the author’s agenda but we readily embrace anything they say that harms their agenda. In my education classes, which are based around Critical Theory as opposed to critical reasoning, we are being taught something slightly different. We should not only look for the voices behind texts but also whose voices are being suppressed as if authors engage in oppression by the very act of writing. This sets up the concept of master and counter-narratives. 

From the perspective of Critical Theory, it is the job of the teacher to promote counter-narratives to rescue students from the grip of the master narrative. Any teacher who tries to simply do what history teachers have traditionally been supposed to do, mainly teaching facts and how to critically analyze them is guilty of silencing minority voices. It should be understood that, from the perspective of Critical Theory, minority voices are not really literal minorities but the purveyors of Critical Theory themselves, who are supposed to serve as the voice for authentic minorities who have been silenced. By silencing what is meant is that others have failed to fully embrace the assumptions of Critical Theory. In essence, Critical Theory is an attempt by those in power to justify their privilege and suppress anyone who disagrees with them by pretending that their opponents are the master oppressors while they are really the victims attempting to advance their counter-narrative. 

The true power of a master narrative can be seen in its willingness to unabashedly claim the moral high ground of a counter-narrative for itself with every expectation that you can intimidate your opponents into acquiescence. The true master claims to be a victim. If you can claim to be a victim then you implicitly earn the moral right to do all the sorts of terrible things to others that only masters are able to get away with. Real victims know that they do not have power and that it is useless to even speak up and claim to be a victim because the real oppressors will simply use it as an excuse to abuse them further. Morally sane individuals recognize that they are a mixture of oppressor and victim along a spectrum as are their opponents. They try to morally improve themselves in a variety of ways including trying to see things from their opponent's perspective.  

If you wish to understand the logic of a real master narrative, consider the example of the novel and film Gone With the Wind. On the surface, Gone With the Wind’s narrative of the Civil War and Reconstruction is an obvious master narrative. The heroes are literal slave owners and the book is a defense of the Confederacy and the Ku Klux Klan. All of this is true but it misses the fact that the true diabolical genius of the book is its ability to sell itself precisely as a counter-narrative. 

According to the Gone With the Wind narrative, which I find abhorrent and should not be the premise for any history class, once upon there lived a class of white Southern planters. They were a noble group with an interest in the finer things of life like manners and art as opposed to money. These planters were of such an elevated nature that they were capable of "ennobling" even the blacks who worked for them as slaves as this made the blacks part of the South's "uplifting" culture. The planters looked after their slaves as if they were "their own children." Then came the Northern Capitalist industrialists who cared nothing about culture but only for money. The Northerners built a mighty war machine and crushed the peaceful South. In order to justify their pillaging of the South, the Northerners claimed that they had come to liberate the slaves from the oppression of their masters. Many of the blacks believed these lies and turned against their "kind" masters who had treated them so well. In truth, these blacks were not being liberated. On the contrary, they were being enslaved to the relentless power of Capitalism.

The need to preserve a sense of aristocracy as something above money is critical for understanding the role of the Terra plantation in the novel. Scarlett O'Hara struggles to hold on to Terra in the face of Northern tax collectors even though it does not make economic sense. The fact that Terra is not that valuable is precisely the point. As long as Scarlett can hold on to Terra, she is still an aristocrat, someone who can love a piece of land as something that will continue to exist after she is dead, regardless of the dollars and cents involved. Similarly, Ashley Wilkes is tempted by an offer to get a job in New York. Ashley is a smart guy and would certainly do well for himself. The problem is that going to New York would mean that he is no longer an aristocrat but instead just another guy trying to earn a buck with no sense of the larger sweep of history. 

The "poor oppressed" Southerners, "robbed" of their "rightful" place of wealth and influence struggle to bring justice back to the land and join the Klan. In the novel, Scarlett is warned that she should not ride around by herself conducting her business because they are likely to be attacked by one of the free blacks that the Northern occupiers have allowed to run wild. If this happens the Klan, which all the "good" white men of the town have joined, would be honor-bound to retaliate. Scarlett gets attacked and the Klan is "forced" to go after the camp of free blacks. They run into an ambush and Scarlett's second husband gets killed. This leads Scarlett to agree to marry Rhett Butler as Ashley still insists on being faithful to his wife Melanie.     

At one point, Scarlett is forced to confront the "master" narrative head-on in the form of Northerners whose ideas of the South come straight from Uncle Tom's Cabin. Scarlett responds that the novel is full of lies and that they never abused their slaves. She should be believed as she has actual "lived experience" with slaves, unlike the Northerners who have only read about the South in books designed to convince them to hate Southerners. The stakes are high. Either Southerners really did treat their slaves well or at least justly or it was right for General Sherman to pillage his way across Georgia, freeing the slaves and repaying their owners for their crimes. 

It is hardly obvious how Critical Theorists can dismiss the Gone With the Wind narrative out of hand as a master narrative. The narrative is not really that different from the standard Critical Theory narrative. All you have to do is change the labels. Southern plantation owners can be revolutionary intellectuals and the black slaves can be workers who need to achieve critical consciousness. This is accomplished by the workers joining the intellectuals in a farming commune to labor for the "common good." In both cases, the enemy is Capitalism, the notion that people should be empowered simply because of their ability to make money as opposed to elevating those who can transcend such petty interests.

To say that Southern planters were rich and therefore must represent the master narrative fails to hold up. Loads of horrible things happen to Scarlett and she spends much of the middle part of the book trying to keep everyone around her, including her former slaves, fed and with a roof over their heads. Much of Scarlett’s power as a character is derived from her ability to do this while not losing sight of the higher things in life as embodied in Terra. This is critical because it allows us to forgive Scarlett for the pretty terrible things she does to succeed like stealing her sister's fiance (the one who gets killed riding for the Klan) and using convict labor provided by the Northern occupation. In truth, Scarlett being rich should not exclude her from being a counter-narrative. If you can watch Oprah Winfrey interview Meghan Merkle, two of the most privileged beings who have ever lived, without it being obvious that they are perpetuating a master narrative then you should have no problem seeing Gone With the Wind as a counter-narrative. 

From the perspective of Critical Theory, the real crime of the Gone With the Wind narrative is not that it oppressed blacks but that it empowered the "wrong" sort of people. How dare Southern planters claim to be victims and use that argument to justify holding on to power. The people who should be in charge are leftist intellectuals who have educated themselves about the nature of oppression through the lens of Critical Theory. They are therefore the sort of morally superior individuals who are well-suited to decide who is a victim and who is an oppressor. This is such an obvious fact that if you disagree it can only be because you are an oppressor.  

A proper history education should liberate students by giving them weapons to intellectually challenge those authority figures who seek to rule over them. It is important to expose students to brilliant and evil books like Gone With the Wind so that they can learn to see a master narrative at work. What makes Gone With the Wind a true master narrative is precisely its ability to pretend to be a counter-narrative. The heroes are "victims" who are not in the positions of power that they are naturally entitled to. This gives them the right to strike back at the "oppressors" who wrongfully hold a position better than what they deserve. If my students wish to recognize who is ruling over them, the first thing they should look for is who claims that their status of victimhood is an unchallengeable fact and that anyone who voices any skepticism is automatically a master oppressor.   

Even My Textbook Agrees That Critical Literacy is Not the Same Thing As Critical Thinking

 

I have previously argued that critical thinking is not the same thing as critical theory. The following is from the education textbook Content Area Literacy and it seems to take a similar line. 

Note that critical literacy is embedded with being culturally conscious. Make no mistake. Being culturally conscious here does not mean not making fun of a student for things like their clothes or accent. Instead, it is a willingness to define students based on their culture. According to the textbook:

Obviously, there is nothing wrong with trying to run a classroom that values respect, harmony, and cooperation as opposed to competition. It is quite possible that Native-American students are more likely to benefit from such a class. That being said, assuming that individual Native-American students are not inclined toward competition reeks of the same racist obtuseness of a sports coach trying to recruit those same Native-American students because of their people's "natural warrior spirit." Students should be treated as individuals and teachers should attempt to provide the best style of education they can for each student regardless of their culture. 

Furthermore, culture is only relevant if the student decides that it is. It is possible that our Native-American student despises everything about Native-American culture and wishes to become a Scotsman. Perhaps their love for cooperation has led them to become fanatical followers of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. That is their right and the teacher should respect that. There should be no assumption that just because a student is ethnically Native-American that being Native-American has any relevance to their lives. In truth, I am skeptical about the deep commitment of most kids to any minority culture in the absence of someone else consciously making an issue about it. In my experience, kids, being kids, have other things on their minds. This is to say nothing of them having a worked-out theory about how their culture affects things like their competitiveness. If parents wish to raise their children with a cultural identity that is well and good. I see no reason, as a teacher, why this should be any of my business. What I care about is their ability to use the historical method.     

This emphasis on cultural groups serves as the basis for the politics of critical reading. Critical thinking is fundamentally an apolitical act. It is a useful tool to justify telling people with ideologies to shove it so that they leave you alone. As a historian, I am constantly aware that texts were written by people with an agenda. We do not have all perspectives. For example, we lack Cathar voices as the thirteenth-century French monarchy backed by Catholic Church wiped them out. We certainly need to be careful with what our Catholic sources have to say about the Cathars. Since we lack Cathar sources, we should try to imagine what Cathar sources might say if we had them. Beyond a certain skepticism of people in power, who are likely to produce source material, there is a little in the way of practical political lessons to take from studying the Cathars.

One can make a good case that studying the Cathars has little relevance to the lives of students. In truth, that is a reason to teach Cathar History. A great virtue of studying history and a reason why we should be teaching it is precisely its disassociation from real life. In a similar vein, this is a reason to expose students to literature and theater. We want students to step out of themselves and imagine an outside perspective like Smith's impartial observer. This is an essential part of being a rational individual. Other people, not being you, cannot be relied upon to understand or sympathize with your personal truth. What can cross the divide to other minds is reason. The historical method is a set of rules that all people can embrace in order to achieve a baseline agreed-upon reality. 

By contrast, critical reading is highly political. It is not just that our sources do a better job covering the perspectives of wealthy, educated men; other groups have been silenced, implying that the authors of our sources have wronged others by the mere fact that they wrote something down. Furthermore, we are, somehow, implicated in that crime by using the sources most easily available to us. For example, we might imagine that the very act of being a primary source about the Cathars makes someone complicit in their destruction. Furthermore, someone like me, a Jew, am somehow to blame for the lack of Cathar sources. By using Catholic sources, I link my soul to the Inquisition. Keep in mind that, for critical theory, oppression has nothing to do with physically hurting anyone. You are an oppressor merely through some kind of association with an oppressive structure. If you benefit from oppression and fail to acknowledge and denounce that benefit to the satisfaction of critical theorists, you are an oppressor. 

As I understand the argument, it is because of this taint that history has not been fair in terms of both its reality and surviving sources that we have the responsibility to work for social justice. Using our classes as platforms to promote social justice allows us to atone for our insufficient teaching of non-white male history. One might ask how are students supposed to work for any kind of justice if they have been brought to that position by a study of history tainted by a desire to turn them into activists? Keep in mind that the central premise of the historical method is that the very fact that a historical source was written to support a claim makes it useless for advancing that very claim. By contrast, we readily believe sources when they undermine their original intention. For example, we do not believe our Catholic sources that tell us that Cathars conducted sex-rites. That being said, we do believe those same sources when they imply that people were attracted to Cathars by the personal piety of Cathar clergy.  

Students can take what I teach them about history seriously precisely to the extent that it has nothing to do with their lives. I honestly have no idea what studying Cathar history has to do with voting for an American political party. My job is to teach people how to process historical information. To do that job well, I cannot be doing anything else. The moment I try to do more, I risk doing nothing and being nothing more than a waste of my student's time.